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Mortgage Lending: 5.12.9 Intentional Interference with Contract

It seems only fair that lenders who quietly reward brokers for bringing borrowers to them, passing on the cost of that reward to the borrower,594 should share blame for the brokers’ breach of duty, which naturally follows. One common-law claim that may help borrowers challenge lenders for suborning this breach of fiduciary duty is intentional interference with a contractual relationship.595

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.11b Redressability

The third requirement for Article III standing articulated by Supreme Court decisions is that the plaintiff’s injury must be one “that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”2128 An unpublished Seventh Circuit opinion holds that an FDCPA plaintiff’s failure to pray explicitly for actual damages did not mean that her injury, which included a modest expenditure for postage, was not redressable by a favorable decision.

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.12a Pleading

Before filing an FDCPA complaint, it is important to interview the consumer carefully to identify any harm the consumer suffered beyond experiencing the violation.2126 A very small loss may be sufficient to establish standing.2127

Truth in Lending: 11.2.1 Introduction

The availability of statutory damages eliminates the need to put a value on a consumer’s injury, but it does not eliminate the constitutional requirement for an injury in fact. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to cases and controversies. Article III standing when seeking statutory damages under a federal consumer protection statute, such as TILA, has become an important issue since the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v.

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.2.2.4 The role of Congress’s judgment

Spokeo very clearly holds that “the judgment of Congress” plays an “important role[]” in determining whether an intangible injury is concrete.1485 The decision holds that, “because Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also instructive and important.”1486 It quotes with approval two of its earlier decisions, holding that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.2.2.6 Is the risk of harm a concrete injury?

Ramirez appears to cut back on the principle that Spokeo seemed to adopt, that “the risk of real harm” can be a concrete injury in a suit seeking money damages.1500 Where there is only a risk of harm, the majority opinion in Ramirez states that standing is confined to suits seeking prospective relief, such as an injunction.1501 This statement appears to be dicta, because the Court concluded on the facts that the plaintiffs

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.3.4.2a Confusion

Some courts have held that confusion due to a misleading or unclear collection communication is a concrete injury1706 Ramirez adds some weight to this view, in that it cites the fact that the plaintiffs, other than Ramirez himself, did not present any evidence “that they were confused, distressed, or relied on the information in any way” as support for its conclusion that the plaintiffs had not alleged a concret

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.3.4.2a Confusion

Some courts have held that confusion due to a misleading or unclear collection communication is a concrete injury1723 Ramirez adds some weight to this view, in that it cites the fact that the plaintiffs, other than Ramirez himself, did not present any evidence “that they were confused, distressed, or relied on the information in any way” as support for its conclusion that the plaintiffs had not alleged a concret

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.3.3 Distinguishing Between Procedural and Substantive Violations

In framing an FDCPA claim, it may be helpful to present it as a violation of a substantive rather than a procedural right to the extent possible. In Spokeo, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “procedural” rights and “substantive” rights. It characterized the rights involved in the case as procedural, and held that, at least in some circumstances, a “bare procedural violation” without some other concrete harm would not establish standing.1636

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.3.4.1 Examples

Spokeo and Ramirez make clear that both tangible and intangible injuries can meet the concreteness requirement.1648 Concrete harms that would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement and that an individual consumer might suffer as a result of nondisclosure, false, deceptive, or misleading statements, telephone harassment, or other FDCPA violations might include:

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.4.1 Generally

Congress identified deceptive debt collection practices as one of its primary concerns when it enacted the FDCPA.1764 Many provisions of the FDCPA protect debtors from false, deceptive, or misleading practices.

Fair Debt Collection: 11.15.3.4.2a Confusion

Some courts have held that confusion due to a misleading or unclear collection communication is a concrete injury1706 Ramirez adds some weight to this view, in that it cites the fact that the plaintiffs, other than Ramirez himself, did not present any evidence “that they were confused, distressed, or relied on the information in any way” as support for its conclusion that the plaintiffs had not alleged a concret