Consumer Credit Regulation: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1321.51 to 1321.60 (West) (General Loan Law).
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Does not apply to:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Does not apply to:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Does not apply to:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Act prescribes maximum charges for all creditors, except lessors, but excludes:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Applies to any lending institution or licensee under § 19-14-1 that offers or extends credit in the form of a credit card transaction. “Lending institution” is defined by § 19-9-1 as any regulated institution and any person that makes loans of money or negotiates the lending of money for another in any state or jurisdiction. § 19-14-1 provides for licensure of, inter alia, lenders making small loans, check cashers, debt-management service providers, and mortgage loan originators.
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Applies generally to consumer credit transactions. § 37-1-201. Includes rules for “supervised” loans (those exceeding 12% interest). Also includes rules for “restricted loans” (certain loans of $7,500 or less), which are summarized in the closed-end summaries. Does not apply to:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g. banks vs. non-banks)? Any person engaged in the business of lending money. § 54-4-40. Statute exempts banks and their subsidiaries, South Dakota chartered trust companies, and retail installment sellers. §§ 54-4-37, 54-4-64.
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Applies to all lenders but exempts some from licensure requirement.
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Applies generally to extensions of credit to natural persons, but excludes:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Applies generally to consumer lending, but excludes:
What types of lenders it applies to (e.g., banks vs. non-banks): Act prescribes maximum charges for all creditors, § 40-14-107.
In many a routine chapter 7 bankruptcy, the only event of any real importance between filing and discharge is the meeting of creditors, sometimes colloquially called the “first meeting of creditors” or the “section 341(a) meeting” in honor of the relevant statutory provision. While it may pose occasional problems, this proceeding is usually routine and uneventful.
Once the time for objecting to a discharge has passed in a chapter 7 case and proof of the debtor’s completion of a financial education course has been filed, with a few limited exceptions, the debtor is entitled to a discharge.326
The most important document filed in a chapter 13 case is usually the debtor’s proposed plan. This plan, which only the debtor can propose, sets out how the debtor wishes to reorganize their financial situation. Its purpose, then, is to make clear how the debtor desires payments and distributions to be made in the case. The plan may be modified as of right before confirmation and also, with the court’s permission, after confirmation in certain circumstances.242
Creditors are liable for improper autodialed or prerecorded calls to cell phones by their debt collectors.203 In a 2008 ruling, the FCC determined that: “[A] creditor on whose behalf an autodialed or prerecorded message call is made to a wireless number bears the responsibility for any violation of the Commission’s rules. Calls placed by a third party collector on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself placed the call.”204
The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009227 amended the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to make it unlawful for any person to transmit misleading or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. The FCC has adopted Truth in Caller ID Act regulations,228 which closely follow the requirements of the Act itself.
Effective July 1, 2023, Department of Education (the Department) regulations governing schools’ program participation agreements will prohibit institutions that participate in the Federal Direct Loan Program from “requiring borrowers to agree to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements or waiver of class action lawsuits.”214 Specifically, schools that wish to participate in the Direct Loan Program must agree that they will not:
In City of Miami v. Bank of America Corp.,80 the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of the City’s discriminatory predatory lending claims against Bank of America. The City’s complaint focused on the bank’s practice of directing predatory loan terms towards Black and Latinx borrowers in Miami from 2004 to 2012. The City alleged both intentional discrimination and a discriminatory impact from the bank’s practices.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit duly examined whether “some direct relation” existed between Wells Fargo’s intentional policies and the economic harm that the City of Miami alleged.89 With respect to the claim that the lending policies caused property values to drop, thereby leading to diminished tax revenues, the Eleventh Circuit held that the City’s complaint met the Supreme Court’s proximate cause standard.90 The bank’s practices caused an injury to the City that was quantifiable and dist
Recent lower court rulings confirm that injury to a government entity can support claims based on violations of fair lending laws.
State law other than the UCC may provide additional protections for co-signers. For example, an Illinois statute requires a notice be sent to the co-signor of the primary obligor’s delinquency, and fifteen days must elapse before the creditor can report negatively on the co-signer to a consumer reporting agency.609
The CFPB issued an advisory opinion clarifying that entities that qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA that bring or threaten to bring state court foreclosure actions on time-barred mortgage debt may violate Regulation F § 1006.26—even if the debt collector did not know that the debt was time barred. See 88 Fed. Reg. 26,475 (May 1, 2023).
In an 8–1 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that the government may move at any time to dismiss an FCA qui tam action over the relator’s objection, so long as it intervenes in the case:32
A 2021 Supreme Court decision, Uzuegbunam v.
The third requirement for Article III standing articulated by Supreme Court decisions is that the plaintiff’s injury must be one “that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”2111 An unpublished Seventh Circuit opinion holds that an FDCPA plaintiff’s failure to pray explicitly for actual damages did not mean that her injury, which included a modest expenditure for postage, was not redressable by a favorable decision.