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15.2.3.3 Holders of Remainder Interests and Other Interests Less Than Fee Simple

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  4. 15.2 Homestead Exemptions
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  6. 15.2.3.3 Holders of Remainder Interests and Other Interests Less Than Fee Simple

15.2.3.3 Holders of Remainder Interests and Other Interests Less Than Fee Simple

Homestead statutes generally require some form of legal ownership,62 although it need not be fee simple. Sometimes the debtor will have only a remainder interest in the home, while a parent or some other relative holds a life estate. Many courts apply the rule of liberal construction to protect the holder of the remainder interest.63 It may also be possible to exempt a life estate.64

Some courts allow homestead exemptions when the property is owned by a trust.65 However, in one case a bankruptcy court held that the debtors’ power to amend a trust into which they had transferred their home became property of the estate when they filed bankruptcy. The court allowed the bankruptcy trustee to exercise this power and appoint a substitute trustee to sell the property, paying the debtors the value of the life estate they had reserved.66

Courts have also applied homestead exemptions to homes tied up in probate,67 homes being purchased under installment contracts,68 and even rental homes.69 Some courts protect a debtor’s equitable interest70—for example, one that is created when the debtor lives in a home owned by a spouse or partner and makes the payments or invests in repairs or improvements.71 Courts have been less willing to recognize a homestead exemption in property owned by a partnership72 or limited liability corporation.73

Footnotes

  • 62 Bullard v. IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., 539 Fed. Appx. 665 (6th Cir. 2013) (Michigan homestead exemption available only to debtor who owns and occupies the property, not to husband when property was solely in wife’s name); In re Varrone, 2012 WL 1079005 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (debtor whose ownership rights had been cut off by decree of partition and sale could not claim homestead, even though she could occupy home until it was sold; New York homestead requires both ownership and occupancy); In re Hampshire, 505 B.R. 668 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014) (debtor had no ownership interest in property inherited by wife; right to elective share if wife pre-deceased him was not sufficient); In re Foster, 2014 WL 7013936 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 2014) (ownership means an interest that could be seized by a creditor; non-titled wife may not claim homestead in marital home); In re Martinez, 469 B.R. 74 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012) (non-titled husband’s rights in marital home not sufficient to support exemption; must show that property is “owned, leased, or being purchased”); In re Padilla Padilla, 2011 WL 5911243 (Bankr. D. P.R. Nov. 28, 2011) (non-titled spouse who invested substantial funds and labor in improving marital residence had no property interest to support homestead exemption); GMAC Mortg., L.L.C. v. Arrigo, 8 N.E.3d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (Illinois homestead requires “formalized” ownership; rights created by Rights of Married Persons Act insufficient to provide homestead rights to non-titled spouse). But see Law v. Law, 163 So. 3d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (non-titled wife had beneficial interest in former marital home and sales proceeds sufficient to support homestead exemption). But cf. Brattleboro Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hardie, 94 A.3d 1132 (Vt. 2014) (“equitable title” is sufficient, but must show “clear right to obtain legal title”; not shown here when wife had asked divorce court to award former second home to her, but court had broad discretion to award property to either party).

  • 63 In re Stenzel, 301 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2002) (Minn. law) (one-third remainder interest in property, in which mother held life estate, was sufficient to support homestead exemption; remanding to resolve occupancy questions); In re Rasmussen, 456 B.R. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (debtors, who owned remainder interest and resided with life tenant, owned and occupied the property; vested remainder is ownership interest); In re Roos, 590 B.R. 803 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2018) (allowing homestead exemption to debtor who was a “tenant in common for life with remainder to the survivor in fee”); In re Thomason, 2013 WL 625343 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 19, 2013) (remainder interest plus clear showing of intent to reside sufficient; here, debtors had filed declaration of abandonment for current residence and declaration of homestead for remainder interest, and made arrangements to move in and care for frail life tenant); In re Hildebrandt, 432 B.R. 852 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. June 30, 2010) (debtor who owned remainder interest had present right to occupy sufficient to support Florida homestead; evidence showed that when elderly aunt, with whom debtor had resided for years, deeded her the property, she intended to grant right of occupancy); In re Williams, 427 B.R. 541 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (debtor, who resided with life tenant, his mother, and assisted her with daily living and had vested remainder interest pursuant to both Florida probate law and contract with mother, had sufficient right to occupy to support Florida homestead); In re Kimble, 344 B.R. 546 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (debtors who owned remainder interest, and resided in manufactured home on property with permission of life tenant, could claim exemption; “interest” in Ohio exemption statute includes future interests); In re Franklino, 329 B.R. 363 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2005) (homestead exemption may be applicable to remainder interest in out-of-state property if claimant shows intent to occupy property when it becomes available); In re Cain, 235 B.R. 812 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1998) (allowing remainderman to claim homestead exemption in home where he resided with life tenant, his mother); In re Hankel, 223 B.R. 728 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1998) (North Dakota homestead exemption protects son’s future interest in house where he resided with his elderly mother, who held a life estate). See also In re Vasques, 337 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (mother’s homestead declaration sufficient to protect remainder interest of daughter who lived there). Cf. In re Plaster, 271 B.R. 202 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (owner of remainder interest may not claim homestead unless head of household; not shown here although debtor assisted her aunt, the life tenant, and paid some household bills). But see Gordon v. Pappalardo (In re Gordon), 487 B.R. 600 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013) (Massachusetts homestead exemption does not protect a remainder interest, as it is not listed in definition of “owner”); In re Freeman, 520 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014) (holding that Massachusetts does not allow homestead in remainder interest, as holder of remainder interest is not defined as an owner, but concluding that this debtor held more than a remainder interest); In re Pettit, 231 B.R. 101 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (Florida’s homestead exemption did not protect future interest when debtor resided with mother, who had deeded property to debtor but reserved a life interest for herself). But cf. In re Corse, 486 B.R. 241 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2013) (denying exemption for one-quarter remainder interest when no intent to reside on property; must show either current residence or intent to reside “as soon as legally possible”), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 WL 652268 (D.R.I. Feb. 19, 2014); In re Brunson, 498 B.R. 160 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013) (remainder exempt only if present possessory interest shown; denying exemption although debtors resided in house and cared for life-tenant father, because life estate did not formally grant right to occupy).

  • 64 See, e.g., In re DuFour, 2015 WL 5999657 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2015) (widow owned 50% interest in former marital home and usufruct (similar to a life estate) in other 50% that was owned by her adult children; both interests were exempt homestead); In re Peirce, 467 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (debtors owned life estate in property owned by trust of which they were trustees; allowing exemption of life estate). See also In re Hopson, 2019 WL 1002499 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2019) (elderly widow sold her home and gave the proceeds to her credit-worthy daughter and son-in-law to purchase a house with the informal understanding that she would be allowed to live there for the rest of her life; even if this did not meet the technical requirements of a life estate, it may be an equitable interest sufficient to support the exemption).

  • 65 In re Kester, 493 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kan. law) (allowing homestead exemption when property owned by self-settled, revocable trust); In re Parr, 2018 WL 564572 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Jan. 26, 2018) (occupancy plus equitable interest are sufficient; exempting home owned by self-settled revocable trust), aff’d, 778 Fed. Appx. 569 (10th Cir. 2019); In re Vazquez, 2012 WL 601593 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2012) (Texas statute allowing exemption of homes owned by certain trusts is purely prospective but, even without statute, debtor who was sole trustee and sole beneficiary of trust that owned her home was owner who could claim exemption); In re Vess, 2018 WL 722408 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2018) (exempting home owned by trust); In re Sullivan, 550 B.R. 163 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts homestead protects resulting trust created when debtor’s sister purchased condominium to be occupied by debtor, with understanding that she would transfer title after debtor paid off mortgage); In re Newcomb, 513 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014) (allowing debtor to claim homestead in residence owned by trust whose sole beneficiary was another trust in which debtor owned a remainder interest; noting that “imprecision” in homestead declaration as to how debtor obtained ownership does not defeat claim); In re VanBuskirk, 511 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014) (debtors who owned 25% interest in trust that owned their residence could claim homestead, but only 25% of Massachusetts automatic homestead amount); In re Welch, 486 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (Massachusetts homestead law exempts property owned by a trust); In re Peake, 480 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012) (beneficiary of self-settled trust that owns his home can claim homestead for his equitable interest in the property); In re Starr, 485 B.R. 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012) (exempting home owned by self-settled trust; noting lack of Ohio authority, and applying principle of liberal construction); In re Larsen, 2011 WL 4621556 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2011) (Iowa explicitly permits homestead in property owned by certain types of trusts); In re Rodrigues, 2010 WL 716192 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2010) (home owned by debtor’s estate planning trust exempt under Massachusetts law allowing homestead for non-owner who possesses premises “by lease or otherwise” when debtor as trustee granted herself right to occupy); In re Cocke, 371 B.R. 554 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (liberally construing homestead exemption to protect property owned by trust, when debtors resided on property, had right to exclude others, and all other rights of ownership except right to divide up property; key issue is whether debtors had legal or equitable right to use property as residence); Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 365 S.W.3d 888 (Ark. 2010) (allowing homestead in property owned by revocable trust, of which debtor was both trustee and beneficiary); Cutler v. Cutler ex rel. Estate of Cutler, 994 So. 2d 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (property was homestead even though long-time owner conveyed it to an irrevocable trust for estate planning purposes, reserving a life estate); Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (judgment debtor may claim Florida homestead exemption in her residence, although property titled in trustee, as debtor has “beneficial interest”). See also In re Swyzd, 370 B.R. 882 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007) (Mass. law) (debtor may claim homestead exemption in house owned by a trust when, at time homestead filed, debtor had succeeded parents as trustee and was the only beneficiary, so debtor held both legal and equitable interests); In re Bogetti, 349 B.R. 14 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (when home was owned by self-settled revocable trust, it was property of the estate, but debtors could claim homestead exemption); In re Im, 495 B.R. 46 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) (debtor who, with his wife, was co-owner, co-settlor, and co-beneficiary of trust that owned their home had ownership interest sufficient to support homestead claim; denying enhanced personal property exemption for those who do not receive benefit of a homestead exemption); In re Bellingroehr, 403 B.R. 818 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (tenancy-by-the-entireties exemption not lost by transfer to estate planning trust, which imposed same restrictions on alienation by one spouse as are imposed by tenancy by entireties); In re Alexander, 346 B.R. 546 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (Florida statute requires occupancy and a legal or equitable interest that gives right to occupy; here, debtor could claim homestead in property owned by revocable trust of which he was sole trustee and primary beneficiary). Cf. Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App. 2002) (transfer of homestead to family trust did not make it vulnerable to creditors, when Texas fraudulent transfer law does not apply to transfer of exempt property). But see In re Betcher, 2009 WL 210677 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2009) (couple who had transferred home to irrevocable living trust could exempt their possessory right but not fee ownership); In re Zmijewski, 390 B.R. 24 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (couple who owned life interests in home, with remainder held by family trust of which they were trustees, could exempt life interests but not remainder; their interests in trust were personal, not real property); In re Estarellas, 338 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006) (no exemption for property owned by revocable, self-settled, spendthrift trust); In re Barnes, 275 B.R. 889 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (motor home in which debtors resided not homestead because owned by an irrevocable trust); In re Bosonetto, 271 B.R. 403 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (Florida homestead exemption does not apply to property owned by trust). But cf. In re Nardo, 554 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts $500,000 homestead exemption extends to home owned by a trust, but 1% beneficiary is entitled to only 1% of exemption amount); Boyle v. Weiss, 962 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 2012) (former version of Massachusetts homestead statute would not exempt home owned by trust of which debtor was beneficiary and 50% owner).

  • 66 In re Peirce, 483 B.R. 368 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012).

  • 67 In re Pugh, 2015 WL 5145030 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2015) (ownership of deceased mother’s home passed to debtor immediately upon mother’s prepetition death intestate, so property was debtor’s homestead on petition date); In re Tinsley, 2010 WL 4823208 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) (possessory interest sufficiently shown when debtor was devisee under father’s will and no evidence he would not receive title); In re Martinez, 392 B.R. 530 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (allowing homestead exemption to debtor who resided in home owned by her late father, who had died intestate and whose estate was being administered, as title vests in heir by operation of law upon decedent’s death); In re Dougan, 350 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (mother’s will, which was still in probate, left home to debtor daughter who resided there, with mother’s permission, during mother’s lifetime; possessory interest, plus equitable interest arising from will, were sufficient ownership and occupation to support homestead exemption); In re Robertson, 227 B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1998) (liberally construing Indiana exemptions to allow homestead exemption in house which had been left to debtor by his deceased landlord, even though landlord’s estate was still in probate). Cf. In re Tetreault, 11 A.3d 635 (R.I. 2011) (mother’s will left property, including the home, to be divided equally between son and daughter; son’s rights as devisee were sufficient ownership to support a homestead exemption, but he no longer met homestead exemption’s occupancy requirement once executrix gave him notice of termination of his tenancy and began eviction action). But cf. In re Stoner, 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) (denying exemption to interest of one-third contingent beneficiary who was occupying late father’s home on petition date; father’s will did not bequeath house but directed that property be evenly divided among children); In re Wisotzke, 2011 WL 445812 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011) (decedent’s son did not have sufficient ownership interest in home to claim homestead exemption when will did not direct transfer of home to him, but he would merely inherit any assets left after estate was administered, and he had not administered the estate or conducted himself as owner); In re Howlett, 440 B.R. 186 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010) (denying homestead exemption for debtor’s interest in deceased mother’s estate planning trust, which owned house; no “current possessory interest” when debtor did not reside in house on petition date and had right only to a percentage of the sales price).

  • 68 In re New, 2013 WL 4715685 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2013) (allowing exemption, despite failure to properly record contract for deed); In re Stone, 329 B.R. 860 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2005) (house being purchased on contract for deed, occupied by debtor’s fiancée and children); In re Hunter, 295 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2003) (homestead established when married person or head of household occupies property as home; “contract for deed” sufficient); In re Sorrell, 292 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002) (buyers could claim homestead in house they were buying under contract for deed, under which seller retained title until payments completed); Redmond v. Kester, 159 P.3d 1004 (Kan. 2007) (homestead exemption may be based on executory contract to purchase). See also In re Hodes, 402 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2005) (homestead exemption for funds prepaid to builder pursuant to binding contract for addition to homestead); In re McKown, 2003 WL 22119193 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003) (debtor may claim homestead exemption in property purchased at sheriff’s sale when she had paid the sale price and moved in and sale was confirmed, even though deed not yet issued). But cf. In re Page, 289 B.R. 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (seller had no homestead exemption in property she was selling under contract for deed, when purchasers were living in house and making payments; seller’s interest was security interest, which gave her no right to occupy property).

  • 69 In re Casserino, 379 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (occupancy, not legal title, is basis for homestead; Oregon exemption protects prepaid rent and security deposits for leased premises because loss would likely result in eviction); In re Sain, 584 B.R. 325 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2018) (applying California’s automatic homestead to leasehold property occupied by debtor and his children; complicated transaction in which debtor’s credit-worthy father bought back home from bankruptcy trustee and leased it to debtor); In re Cohen, 2012 WL 400719 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 7, 2012) (leasehold with option to purchase; statute allows homestead in house on land owned by another if debtor is leasing or purchasing the dwelling); In re McCallister, 2008 WL 515508 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2008) (Illinois homestead, which applies to “interest in land or buildings . . . rightfully possessed . . . by lease or otherwise” protects tenant’s security deposit; purpose of homestead is to keep roof over debtor’s head, and requirement to turn over security deposit would likely result in eviction); In re Coffey, 339 B.R. 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) ($7500 prepaid rent was exempt “leasehold”); In re Rutland, 318 B.R. 588 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (Alabama homestead protects tenancy in rented apartment; prepaid rent is exempt); In re McAtee, 154 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1993) (debtors who had house on public land, which they rented on ninety-nine-year lease, may claim homestead exemption); In re Bartlett, 153 B.R. 881, 883 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993) (allowing homestead in house situated on leased land); In re Buzzell, 110 B.R. 440 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (life estate or leasehold interest sufficient; manufactured home on rented land is exempt); Geraci v. Sunstar EMS, 93 So. 3d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (condo occupied pursuant to 100-year lease covered by Florida homestead exemption); Redmond v. Kester, 159 P.3d 1004 (Kan. 2007) (Kansas homestead may be based on leasehold). See also In re Takes, 478 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2007) (Iowa law) (leasehold that can be sold—here, created by paying entrance fee to assisted living community—is property right that will support a homestead exemption, but ordinary landlord-tenant relationship is not); In re Wynn, 369 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (proceeds of former marital home spent on rent exempt). But see In re Eagle, 373 B.R. 609 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007) (no homestead exemption in debtor’s former home, which he was now leasing; “ownership interest” required); In re LaVelle, 350 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005) (no homestead claim for land occupied under oral at-will sublease from company wholly owned by husband, which was tenant under lease from LLC 70% owned by debtors; lease terminable at will was not “ownership interest”); In re Tenorio, 107 B.R. 787, 788 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (year-to-year lease of condominium unit not an ownership interest protected by Florida homestead); Savage v. Pierson, 157 P.3d 697 (Nev. 2007) (prepaid rent not exempt under homestead or dwelling exemptions that cover land, manufactured home, cooperative unit or condominium; right to possession not sufficient; equity must be shown). See generally § 15.2.2.4, supra (co-op units and manufactured homes on leased land).

  • 70 In re Gilman, 887 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018) (debtor who is selling home retains an equitable interest in it and may claim homestead exemption if debtor resides there and intends to continue to do so; fact question where home was under contract of sale at time of filing but sale then fell through); In re Cadengo, 370 B.R. 681 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (“any sort of title, legal or equitable” will support homestead exemption; allowing homestead claim when parents’ divorce decree required father to deed house to debtor, who resided there, when she reached majority, which he had not done); Coy v. Mango Bay Prop. & Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (right to occupy is sufficient; once acquired, homestead not lost by court order awarding possession to other spouse; ex-husband entitled to hearing on claim of homestead in former marital home, titled in wife alone); Redmond v. Kester, 159 P.3d 1004 (Kan. 2007) (debtors who occupy and intend to occupy property as homestead may base claim on equitable interest); Brattleboro Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hardie, 94 A.3d 1132 (Vt. 2014) (“equitable title” sufficient to meet ownership requirement of Vermont homestead, but must show “clear right to obtain legal title”; not shown here when wife had asked divorce court to award former second home to her, but court had broad discretion to award property to either party). Cf. In re Hart, 332 B.R. 439 (D. Wyo. 2005) (occupancy plus some legal or equitable interest necessary for statutory homestead exemption; mere occupant not entitled to assert exemption over interests of owner or one with superior title). But see Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 559 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2009) (S.D. law) (when mother gave up life estate to allow holder of remainder interest to refinance, lender’s written promise to allow mother to reside in home for life was not an ownership interest that would support a homestead exemption); In re Belcher, 551 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2008) (Ill. law) (husband, whose name was not on title of marital home, could not claim homestead; some kind of “formal title interest” required, though it need not be fee simple); In re Scotti, 456 B.R. 760 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (South Carolina homestead requires ownership interest; when property titled in wife, husband had at most a possessory interest and equitable distribution rights in case of divorce; allowing couple only one exemption); In re Majors, 2008 WL 5330002 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Dec. 18, 2008) (ownership interest required; not shown when house titled in ex-wife, but separation agreement allowed debtor husband to live there while renovating it for sale and entitled him to half the sales proceeds). But cf. In re Doubov, 423 B.R. 505 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (wife who quitclaimed property to husband without reserving dower interest may not claim homestead; Ohio requires a property interest); In re Perpinan, 2006 WL 3507943 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2006) (California homestead requires both occupancy and ownership; no exemption when alleged ownership arose from sham transaction; debtor purchased interest from mother, with check she never cashed, and shortly thereafter deeded his interest back to her).

  • 71 In re Brown, 408 B.R. 262 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (“any interest in the land whether legal or equitable” will support homestead exemption; here, domestic partner of record owner had “constructive trust and equitable ownership because of financial contributions, continued residency, and agreement with partner); In re Lindquist, 395 B.R. 707 (Bankr. D. Or. 2008) (husband’s name not on title, but he lived in marital home and made the payments; his equitable interest was sufficient that couple could claim the larger exemption for joint owners). But see In re Padilla Padilla, 2011 WL 5911243 (D. P.R. Nov. 28, 2011) (non-titled spouse who invested substantial funds and labor in improving marital residence has no property interest to support homestead exemption). But cf. In re Martinez, 469 B.R. 74 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012) (non-titled husband’s rights in martial home not sufficient to support exemption; no equitable lien because he failed to show that funds he spent for repairs were his separate property).

  • 72 In re Steffen, 405 B.R. 486 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (denying homestead exemption to home owned by limited partnership); In re Hoggarth Bros., 2004 WL 903814 (D.N.D. Apr. 22, 2004) (farm couples resided on land owned by husbands’ farm partnership; wives had no homestead rights); In re Bell, 2007 WL 4190686 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007) (debtor lived in unit in multiple-unit dwelling owned by partnership; California homestead protects only property of natural person, not a partnership); In re Shepard, 2007 WL 1385725 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 7, 2007) (partners may not claim homestead exemption in home owned by partnership); In re Lyle, 355 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2006) (no homestead exemption for property owned by partnership owned by debtors; rights in partnership were personal, not real property); In re Monsivais, 274 B.R. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002) (no homestead exemption for home owned by family partnership); In re Cole, 205 B.R. 382 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997) (homestead was abandoned when land was transferred from natural person to a “family limited partnership”); Siller v. LPP Mortg., Ltd., 264 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App. 2008) (partnership property cannot be homestead).

  • 73 In re Breece, 487 B.R. 599 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2013) (no homestead exemption for home owned by LLC); In re Hewitt, 576 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2017) (defining the type of “equitable interest” that will support Vermont exemption; must show right to obtain title; not shown where property was owned by one-person LLC); In re Schmakel, 2013 WL 594317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2013) (member of LLC has no ownership interest in property titled to LLC; statute allowing exemptions in partnership property does not apply to LLC); In re Coenan, 487 B.R.539 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012) (no exemption for property owned by LLC or corporation); In re Kochman, 2011 WL 5325792 (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2011) (property owned by LLC can never be homestead because homestead may be claimed only by natural person, and property must be owner-occupied); In re Arnhoelter, 431 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010) (denying Wisconsin homestead exemption because property was titled in debtor’s LLC when creditor’s judgment was docketed; title is key issue); In re Hecker, 414 B.R. 499 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (denying homestead to home owned by LLC; Minnesota courts will pierce corporate veil for equitable reasons, generally for homes owned by family farm corporations; declining to do so for luxury home occupied by sophisticated businessman, who did not require the property for his livelihood); In re Moore, 2009 WL 1066135 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2009) (transfer of homestead to LLC of which property owners were sole members eliminated homestead exemption); In re LaVelle, 350 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005) (no homestead claim for interest in LLC that owned land leased and occupied by debtors); Nowak v. Merrill, 2016 WL 3546376 (Cal. Ct. App. June 21, 2016) (unpublished) (California allows homestead only in property owned by natural person; denying homestead in property owned by corporation of which debtor was sole owner and sole shareholder); DeJesus v. A.M.J.R.K. Corp., 255 So. 3d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (denying Florida homestead exemption to home owned by corporation of which debtor was sole owner and shareholder; debtor’s role in corporation did not confer any kind of ownership in its real property); White v. White, 402 P.3d 136 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (construing “individual” in Utah statute to mean natural person; denying exemption for home owned by LLC); Nw. Cascade, Inc. v. Unique Constr., Inc., 351 P.3d 172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (shareholders of corporation that developed subdivision could not exempt the lots they occupied, even though corporate veil had been pierced making them liable for corporation’s debts; shareholders have no property interest in corporation’s physical assets). See also In re Kane, 2011 WL 2119015 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 23, 2011) (property owned by debtor’s LLC, which had been administratively dissolved, was not homestead; dissolved LLC still existed because it had not been properly wound up); Radosevich v. Allen, 2010 WL 1531427 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2010) (no homestead for property owned by corporation; distinguishing revocable trust cases). But see In re Caldwell, 545 B.R. 605 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016) (Nevada allows homestead in property owned by LLC when debtors lived in home and paid mortgage and taxes; bankruptcy cap not triggered when home was transferred back and forth between LLC and family trust); In re Basler, 2011 WL 867131 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 10, 2011) (debtors’ “tacit agreement” with their LLC that they could occupy home it owned was a sufficient “estate or interest in land which gives the right of occupancy or possession” to support Nebraska homestead).