15.2.2.3 Multiple Parcels; Subsidiary Structures and Building Materials

22 In re Johns, 2014 WL 6892744 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) (Idaho law) (if property meets area and value limitations, and parcels are “used as one,” presence of second dwelling does not defeat homestead unless occupant could claim a homestead; allowing exemption of three contiguous parcels, used for gardens, fruit trees, barns, pastures, and a home occupied by family friend at below-market rent); In re Kwiecinski, 245 B.R. 672 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (Wyoming homestead exemption protected both of two contiguous parcels, one of which included owner’s farmhouse, when owner used both parcels); In re McDonald, 471 B.R. 194 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (allowing exemption for parcel lying between home and road where debtors fed deer, walked nature trails, and cut firewood); Painewebber, Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (land claimed as “rural homestead of a family” must be used to support family; tracts used for residence, agriculture, and family recreation were exempt; when parcels are non-contiguous, more than aesthetic enjoyment must be shown, but activity need not make a profit); In re Faulring, 573 B.R. 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017) (federal bankruptcy exemption depends on use as residence, regardless of number of parcels; analyzing uses of three-parcel property and allowing exemption for home and barn used for parking, but denying it as to wooded area and house rented to unrelated tenants); In re Johns, 504 B.R. 657 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2014) (exempting parcels containing barns, riding areas, and gardens; presence of rental home did not eliminate exemption), aff’d, 2014 WL 6892744 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014); In re Mixon, 2014 WL 28669 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 2, 2014) (homestead exemption applies to two parcels where debtor purchased them together and used them as one); In re Soles, 497 B.R. 601 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013) (exemption for “lot or lots” covers contiguous vacant lot); In re Mead, 489 B.R. 363 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2013) (homestead is not limited to single parcel under Vermont law; allowing homestead exemption when two parcels were treated as one); In re Stox, 2011 WL 5902882 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 27, 2011) (allowing homestead claim for three contiguous lots with manufactured homes occupied by debtors and various relatives, vegetable garden, fruit orchard, and storage sheds); In re Jones, 397 B.R. 765 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008) (debtors could exempt house in which they lived and the lot needed to access it); In re Mohammed, 376 B.R. 38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (contiguous lot may be exempt if within the area limitations and not used for business purposes); In re Goff, 2007 WL 1434895 (Bankr. W.D. La. May 11, 2007) (homestead exemption for three contiguous lots: debtors’ home, garage apartment, and vacant lot); In re McManus, 2006 WL 2846861 (Bankr. W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2006) (Louisiana homestead exemption protects contiguous parcels up to statutory size limit); In re Hunter, 295 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2003) (later-purchased contiguous land was homestead when area limitations not exceeded, but here homestead was lost by abandonment); In re Allman, 286 B.R. 402 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (contiguous parcel exempt, if within dollar limit and not used for non-homestead purpose); In re Edwards, 281 B.R. 439 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (burden of proof on objector; homestead use shown when contiguous lot was bought “for privacy,” had some landscaping and a dog run, and children played there; possibility of future development or sale did not destroy exemption); In re Kyllonen, 264 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2001) (contiguous parcels could be exempted but, when land was urban, area limit applied); Davis v. Davis, 864 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (rural homestead not limited to debtor’s residence; if it comprises not more than 160 acres of contiguous land, it may include income-producing property, here a manufactured home park); Baker v. Baker, 202 P.3d 983 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (homestead includes residence and land by which it is surrounded; allowing homestead claim for five contiguous parcels, only one of which included house). See also In re Olson, 2009 WL 1241294 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 4, 2009) (couple owned two contiguous lots, with a house on each; one house occupied by debtors and children, the other by husband’s frail elderly father; wife who moved into second house to care for father-in-law could claim homestead for that lot). But cf. Lanier v. Beaman, 394 B.R. 382 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (homestead exemption did not cover adjacent nine-acre lot used to care for rescued horses; distinguishing cases of use for storage, parking, or other “family purposes”); In re Kology, 499 B.R. 20 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (homestead exemption did not extend to contiguous lots that debtors created by subdividing land on which their home stands); In re Issacs, 491 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2013) (occasional hunting or fruit and firewood gathering not sufficient to exempt vacant contiguous parcel); In re Yonkin, 2013 WL 100416 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2013) (Florida homestead will not cover land which, although within acreage limitations, is clearly not debtor’s home, here a separately platted parcel with a manufactured home rented to unrelated third parties); In re Whitney, 459 B.R. 712 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011) (debtors failed to show homestead use of contiguous vacant lot); In re McComber, 422 B.R. 334 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (debtor owned contiguous parcels, purchased from same grantor at same time but, when homestead declaration referenced only one parcel’s street address, second lot was not exempt); In re Majorins, 2010 WL 1418366 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 22, 2010) (debtor sought to exempt two townhomes, physically joined but on separate lots with separate addresses; because second home could be sold without displacing debtor and family from the first, it was not a dwelling in which claimant resided); In re Beck, 471 B.R. 187 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2012) (denying exemption for property separated from home by a road and having a separate address); In re Olsen, 322 B.R. 400 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005) (homestead exemption not applicable to contiguous parcel that was not “reasonably necessary” for homestead purposes); In re Webb, 263 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (separate parcels on which rental houses were located not part of homestead; distinguishing case of rental for share of crops); In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998) (Wyoming homestead exemption did not protect lots where debtor did not reside and which debtor owned individually, while contiguous lot with residence was owned jointly with spouse).

23 See, e.g., In re Stenzel, 301 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2002) (Minn. law) (fact question whether contiguous parcel sporadically used for agriculture was “used and occupied” as homestead); In re Terrill, 2018 WL 3025399 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 15, 2018) (although debtors claimed homestead tax exemption only for area containing house and barn, the entire property could be exempted where the rest of the land was actually used for homestead purposes, including livestock raising, hunting and fishing, running their catering business, and “general family activities”); In re Fratzke, 534 B.R. 391 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2015) (exempting later-purchased contiguous parcel, used for haying and outfitting that produced income to support homestead and for wood and water used on homestead); In re Zantman, 261 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (contiguous parcels, acquired at different times, were exempt when debtors raised farm animals and planned to plant oats; so long as land is used as one parcel it is homestead, even if zoning law permitted division).

24 See, e.g., In re Wright, 525 B.R. 464 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2015) (exempting contiguous parcel used for parking and storage; lot with house was too small to accommodate these uses); In re Marcus, 2009 WL 262762 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2009) (ownership and homestead use sufficiently shown when debtor owned one-eighth interest in lot contiguous to home and used it for gardening, parking, and recreation); In re Irene, 359 B.R. 435 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007) (condominium owner’s deeded parking space exempt; applying New York Real Property Law definition of condominium unit); In re Hughes, 306 B.R. 683 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (homestead exemption protected tract of land that debtors used for parking and as children’s playground and that was adjacent to leased land on which their manufactured home stood).

25 In re Fiffy, 293 B.R. 550 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003) (Mass. law) (later-purchased contiguous parcels homestead if “used and occupied” for residence; family recreation is sufficient); In re Burrows, 2018 WL 6584887 (Bankr. D.N.H. Dec. 12, 2018) (deck and grassy area used for recreation); In re Regenhardt, 2017 WL 3701217 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2017) (exempting contiguous lot, which was acquired after house lot; contiguous lot used for pool, play structures, and extra parking); In re Huff, 2012 WL 710146 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2012) (subdivision into separate parcels does not impair homestead when second parcel actually used for family recreation); In re Marcus, 2009 WL 262762 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2009) (ownership and homestead use sufficiently shown when debtor owned one-eighth interest in lot contiguous to home and used it for gardening, parking, and recreation); In re Hughes, 306 B.R. 683 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (homestead exemption protected tract of land that debtors used for parking and as children’s playground and that was adjacent to leased land on which their manufactured home stood). But see In re Wilson, 347 B.R. 880 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (Tennessee exemption for property owned and used as “principal place of residence” did not protect contiguous parcel used as backyard for recreational purposes, storage, and gathering firewood; debtors “resided” only on parcel with house).

26 In re Burrows, 2018 WL 6584887 (Bankr. D.N.H. Dec. 12, 2018) (propane tanks and part of irrigation system); In re Bycura, 540 B.R. 211 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015) (debtors lived in small house on thirteen-acre parcel and had carved out one-acre parcel to build a larger home, currently unfinished; as one-acre parcel contained well and driveway for small house, homestead exemption extended to it); In re Vaughn, 2014 WL 2006594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014) (giving weight to fact that parcels were purchased as single tract; second parcel was unimproved, sometimes used recreationally, and contained part of septic system); In re Ford, 415 B.R. 51 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2009) (allowing homestead claim for contiguous parcels; Parcel A contained manufactured home with no running water and would be uninhabitable without Parcel B, which contained building with bathroom and laundry facilities used by debtor), aff’d, 2009 WL 9540679 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2009).

27 In re Ling, 511 B.R. 83 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (contiguous parcels presumed to be homestead; higher standard of proof for non-contiguous; homestead use sufficiently shown when debtors had hunted deer and picked fruit, grown vegetables, and gathered firewood on non-contiguous parcel); In re Pool, 598 B.R. 584 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2019) (Texas exempts non-contiguous parcel used for purposes of a rural home; exempting parcel containing auto shop where debtor earned a living, stored and serviced family cars, repaired household appliances, and fabricated a barbecue pit), aff’d, 2020 WL 903006 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2020); In re Crump, 533 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015) (non-contiguous farmland was being used to support homestead when it was leased to sharecropper, who was making improvements that would become property of landlord at end of lease term); In re Dietz, 2011 WL 671959 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2011) (only rural homestead may exempt non-contiguous lot; raising vegetables, cutting firewood, and storing personal property were sufficient homestead use); In re Haseltine, 2007 WL 2932807 (Bankr. D.N.H. Oct. 25, 2007) (second lot used for “homestead purposes” need not be contiguous, key issue is use; here, contiguous lot with barn and horses was homestead); In re Baker, 307 B.R. 860 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (non-contiguous land must be used for “comfort, convenience or support” of the family; cattle grazing and hunting sufficient; placing land in conservation reserve does not eliminate homestead). See also United States v. Neff, 2007 WL 776532 (D.N.D. Mar. 12, 2007) (two parcels exempt; separated by rough country road and farmed together); In re Norra, 421 B.R. 782 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (debtor owned two non-contiguous manufactured home communities and resided in a unit in one; homestead allowed in entire community where she resided but not in second community). But see In re Minor, 526 B.R. 305 (Bankr. D. Wis. 2015) (refusing to treat two homes on non-contiguous parcels in different counties as a single homestead, even though couple sometimes separated and occupied both simultaneously); In re Keena, 2011 WL 6293219 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2011) (contiguous wooded lot, used for gathering firewood and hunting, not homestead); In re Palmer, 391 B.R. 386 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (non-contiguous parcel can be homestead, but debtor must show use “for the purpose of a home”; not shown here where debtors planned to use land for hay and cattle business but had not yet done so); In re Williams, 345 B.R. 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (Ohio exemption for “one parcel” will not protect non-contiguous land); Michels v. Kozitza, 610 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (Minnesota exemption protects only land contiguous to land on which residence is located, even if non-contiguous land is “agricultural homestead” for tax purposes). But cf. In re Mazon, 387 B.R. 641 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (cabana not part of homestead condo; purchased at different time, located eight floors below homestead, and used as dressing room for pool not as residential); In re Schott, 449 B.R. 697 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011) (to exempt non-contiguous parcel, must show homestead use; occasional recreational use not sufficient).

28 See, e.g., In re Rommer, 549 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2016) (Vermont homestead covers outbuildings and lands; garage and greenhouse, owned by debtor’s company and used to grow crops on which debtor depended for a living, were “necessary and convenient” to use of land as homestead); In re Wright, 525 B.R. 464 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2015) (uninhabitable house used for storage of items that would not fit in debtors’ small home); In re Young, 471 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2012) (allowing exemption of entire parcel, containing debtors’ home and an unoccupied house); In re Sadler, 327 B.R. 654 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2005) (farm buildings, here a machine shed, fall within Iowa statutory exemption for “appurtenances” to homestead).

29 Shigo, L.L.C. v. Hocker, 338 P.3d 421 (Colo. App. 2014).

30 In re Cassetto, 475 B.R. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012). But see In re Graff, 457 B.R. 429 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011) (homestead exemption under federal bankruptcy law extends to the land on which debtors’ manufactured home sits, and the oil and gas rights, not just to the manufactured home); Fitzgerald v. Cadle Co., 2017 WL 4675513 (Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2017) (Texas homestead exemption protects subsurface minerals; concluding that royalties are homestead proceeds, which cannot be reached by turnover order).

31 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.030 (West) (exempting $3500 in material purchased in good faith for use in the repair or improvement of judgment debtor’s principal residence; updated triennially for changes in CPI); In re Grucza, 413 B.R. 96 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009) (cement blocks, delivered to property but not yet assembled into retaining wall that was needed to protect house from serious hazard, are exempt). But see Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Vickers v. Pelsey, 779 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (intent to use mortgage loan proceeds to repair uninhabitable home does not make them exempt when it was currently vacant, even though debtor planned to move there once it was repaired).