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14.5.7 Liability for Wrongful Seizure of Bank Account Funds

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  5. 14.5.7 Liability for Wrongful Seizure of Bank Account Funds

14.5.7 Liability for Wrongful Seizure of Bank Account Funds

Judgment creditors and banks may be liable for wrongfully seizing funds from the debtor’s bank account. For example, in Cruthis v. Firstar Bank,590 the court upheld a jury determination that the bank had illegally converted funds from a debtor’s checking account. Acting on a letter from the debtor’s employer requesting the return of payroll deposits, the bank withdrew funds from the debtor’s account without notice. While acknowledging that banks generally have a right of setoff, the court stated that the bank could not offset debts owed by the depositor to third parties. However, the court also found that the bank’s lack of good judgment did not rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct such that it would support the jury’s punitive damages award.

The more difficult question arises when a bank takes exempt funds from a depositor’s account pursuant to writ of execution or other court order served by the judgment creditor. A number of courts have declined to impose liability on banks, holding that they have no duty to determine independently whether the funds in an account are exempt.591 However, given the relative ease with which banks can now determine the source of electronic deposits and whether the accounts contain only exempt funds, courts are beginning to require them to exercise more diligence.592 Indeed, a California statute requires the garnishee bank to do exactly that.593 The 2011 rule adopted by the Treasury Department, discussed in § 14.5.4, supra, also requires banks to determine whether an account contains electronically deposited exempt federal benefits and to protect two months of benefits from garnishment.

Creditors and creditors’ attorneys who wrongfully seize or freeze exempt funds in bank accounts may be subject to common law claims such as conversion,594 negligence,595 abuse of process,596 civil conspiracy,597 or intentional infliction of emotional distress.598 They may also be subject to statutory claims for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) or state debt collection or deceptive practices statutes.599 Some states have statutes that create a special private cause of action for seizure of exempt property,600 or recognize a tort claim for wrongful garnishment.601 The debtor may also have a private cause of action under the anti-alienation provisions of the Social Security Act or other federal benefits statutes.602 If the state procedures are insufficient to satisfy due process requirements, the debtor may have a section 1983 claim against the state actors and any private parties who acted in concert with them.603

Cases have often turned on the question of whether the creditor or collector knew the funds were exempt. For example, in Hogue v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C.,604 a district court refused to dismiss an abuse of process claim against a creditor—and its attorney—who continued with a bank account garnishment after being given an affidavit and bank statements showing that all the funds were exempt Social Security benefits. On the other hand, some courts have held that creditors and collectors have no duty to investigate whether funds on deposit are exempt, and have rejected claims under the FDCPA and state debt collection statutes where the creditor or collector had no knowledge that the funds were exempt.605

Even if a creditor or collector did not have positive knowledge that the funds were exempt, it may be liable if it falsely stated in court filings that it had reason to believe they were not exempt. For example, in Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co. L.P.A,606 a collection attorney had obtained a bank account garnishment order by submitting an affidavit stating that “the affiant has a reasonable basis to believe that the [bank] may have property, other than personal earnings, of the judgment debtor that is not exempt under the law of this state or the United States.”607 In fact, according to the complaint, the bank account contained solely Social Security benefits. The plaintiffs alleged that the collection attorney had not conducted a debtor’s exam, undertaken discovery, or had any factual basis for believing that the bank account contained non-exempt funds. The Sixth Circuit denied the attorney’s immunity claim, thereby allowing the plaintiff to proceed on his claim that the collection attorney violated the FDCPA by using unfair methods and false, deceptive, and misleading representations to collect the debt.

Standing to sue various defendants can be an issue when bringing suit because of the wrongful seizure of exempt funds, especially if the suit names defendants who have control over, and ability to change, the statewide procedures that allow such seizures. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s action; and (3) the injury can likely be redressed by the cause of action.608 One decision held that a debtor did not have standing to sue the chief justice of the state supreme court who had approved or issued the garnishment forms, or the court clerks who issued the writs of garnishment, when the debtor’s complaint alleged that the wrongful temporary seizure of her exempt funds resulted from misuse of the forms.609 If the complaint had alleged that the injury resulted from state’s procedure itself, the result might have been different. By contrast, although it did not address standing, another decision allowed a suit that challenged the state bank account garnishment procedures to go forward against the state’s chief judge and chief administrative judge, who had general administrative authority over the state courts that issued garnishment orders.610 The court also allowed the suit to go forward against the state superintendent of banks, who supervised and regulated the banks that process garnishment orders.

Footnotes

  • 590 Cruthis v. Firstar Bank, 822 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). See also Odell v. Wallingford Mun. Fed. Credit Union, 2012 WL 4466339 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2012) (credit union’s use of setoff to seize Social Security funds was UDAP violation).

  • 591 See, e.g., Gorstein v. World Sav. Bank, 110 Fed. Appx. 9 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting various federal claims asserted by pro se plaintiff; finding no legal authority for proposition that garnishee bank has duty to determine whether portion of funds in account are exempt); Heaven v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C., 303 F. Supp. 3d 333 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (dismissing FDCPA claim against garnishee bank that froze and turned over exempt funds; garnishee is not a debt collector); Galvan v. Bank of Am., 2018 WL 6649554 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2018) (bank acted properly in freezing account and imposing a garnishment fee for garnishment that was later reversed); Kieffer v. New Century Fin. Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 1853895 (D.N.J. May 21, 2012) (garnishee bank has no duty to determine judgment debtor’s share of funds in joint account); McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, 759 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277–278 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Chappell v. Friedman, 2009 WL 2246575 (D. Md. July 24, 2009) (bank has no duty to assert exemption or disburse exempt direct-deposited Social Security funds to debtor; burden is on debtor to claim exemptions). See also Neal v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 2018 WL 5786119 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2018) (dismissing conversion claim against bank that used its right of setoff to seize debtor’s deposited veterans benefits on the ground that money is not subject to a conversion action unless it is a specific, segregated, or identifiable fund; allowing contract and EFTA claims to proceed but dismissing a number of other claims); Alexander v. Bank of Am., 2007 WL 3046637 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2007) (bank not liable for six-week freeze of SSDI benefits; only remedy for violation of anti-alienation clause is release of garnishment, no intentional infliction of emotional distress when bank acted “promptly” to release garnishment; court assumes that bank could not know funds were exempt until debtor formally claimed exemption); Parker v. Wetch & Abbot, P.L.C., 2006 WL 4846042 (S.D. Iowa July 11, 2006) (freeze of account containing exempt benefits did not violate anti-alienation clause of Social Security Act, state or federal fair debt collection acts, or state consumer protection law); Cruz v. TD Bank, 2 N.E.3d 221 (N.Y. 2013) (no private right of action for bank’s violation of state Exempt Income Protection Act, and debtor’s only remedy is a special proceeding against judgment creditor).

  • 592 See Granger v. Harris, 2007 WL 1213416 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (recipient stated section 1983 claim against bank that disbursed funds to creditor, despite knowledge that funds were Social Security funds; state statute imposing sanctions on bank that failed to comply with restraining order was state compulsion sufficient to allege action under color of state law); Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 2005 WL 2105810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (recent changes in technology, for example, electronic direct deposit of Social Security benefits and ease of identifying deposits as exempt funds, require a re-evaluation of New York procedure allowing prejudgment freeze of bank accounts), later decision at 2006 WL 2013734 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2006) (denying defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal). See also Lincoln Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Miceli, 851 N.Y.S.2d 58 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2007) (table; text available at 2007 WL 2917242) (ordering return of garnished Social Security funds and ordering creditor to include instructions and form in future restraining notices, allowing bank to report and not restrain Social Security funds); Strobach v. WesTex Cmty. Credit Union, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2019 WL 3812366 (Tex. App. Aug. 14, 2019) (garnishee credit union does not have statutory duty to investigate the judgment on which a garnishment order is based, but may breach its contractual duty to exercise ordinary care in handling depositor’s funds if it turns over funds without verifying that the judgment creditor is entitled to them; affirming denial of fraud, UDAP, and negligence claims but reversing denial of contract claim and remanding it for trial). See generally § 13.5, supra (due process protections in garnishment).

  • 593 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.080 (West). See Chung v. Bank of Am., 2004 WL 1938272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (bank garnishee had duty to verify whether funds were exempt). See generally § 14.5.4.9, supra (description of this and other state statutes).

  • 594 Rahaman v. Weber, 2005 WL 89413 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2005) (procedure for claiming exemption, including damages if creditor seized exempt property, did not preclude common law causes of action for conversion against creditor and its attorneys). See also Phillips v. Messerli & Kramer, 2008 WL 5050127 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2008) (allowing negligence claim to go forward against law firm that levied on third party’s funds that were in joint account with judgment debtor; litigation privilege does not protect the firm).

  • 595 Phillips v. Messerli & Kramer, 2008 WL 5050127 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2008) (allowing negligence claim to go forward against law firm that levied on third party’s funds that were in joint account with judgment debtor; litigation privilege does not protect the firm); Alcantar v. Sanchez, 257 P.3d 966 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (allowing negligence claim to go forward against bank that failed to notify non-debtor depositors of garnishment of joint account for debt of one depositor). But see Neal v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 2018 WL 5786119 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2018) (dismissing negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims against bank that used its right of setoff to seize debtor’s deposited veterans benefits; bank owes no duty of care to debtor/depositor).

  • 596 Shaw v. Law Offices of Hayt, Hayt & Landau, L.L.C., 2018 WL 1634829 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2018) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on malicious use of process and abuse of process claims against collection firm that repeatedly levied on account of debtor’s similarly-named non-debtor father); Davis v. Neb. Furniture Mart, Inc., 2012 WL 1252633 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2012) (knowingly garnishing bank account containing only exempt funds is abuse of process; fact issues here as to knowledge, when account was in out-of-state bank used by Department of Employment Security for direct deposit of benefits and debtor was known to be unemployed); Hogue v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (debtor stated abuse of process claim against creditor and its attorney who continued garnishment after being shown affidavit and bank statements showing that account contained only exempt Social Security benefits). But see Parker v. Wetch & Abbot, P.L.C., 2006 WL 4846042 (S.D. Iowa July 11, 2006) (garnishment of exempt funds in bank account not abuse of process, as procedure was used for its intended purpose). But cf. Smith v. Levine, 2006 WL 3704622 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2006) (litigation privilege barred abuse of process claim arising from levy on non-debtor’s account and conversion claim arising from refusal to return improperly seized funds). See generally National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection § 15.2 (9th ed. 2018), updated at www.nclc.org/library.

  • 597 Estrada v. Mendoza, 275 P.3d 1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (allowing consumer to proceed with civil conspiracy claim based on UDAP violation involving deception in obtaining writ to garnish more than the amount owed, but claim based on fraud is dependent on a determination that the underlying garnishment orders were illegal so is barred by collateral estoppel).

  • 598 Albright v. Allied Int’l Credit Corp, 2003 WL 22350928 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2003) (refusing to dismiss claim that creditor committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by threatening to garnish exempt benefits). See generally National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection § 15.6 (9th ed. 2018), updated at www.nclc.org/library.

  • 599 See Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, L.L.P., 875 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2017) (consumer stated FDCPA claim against law firm that, in violation of state law, refused to release bank account garnishment after seeing bank statements showing exempt source of funds and filed documents in court stating falsely that debtor had to prove that exempt funds had not been commingled with non-exempt funds); Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co. L.P.A., 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006), on remand, 2008 WL 419943 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2008) (fact question whether affidavits were deceptive or unconscionable in violation of FDCPA and, if so, whether bona fide error defense proven); Baltazar v. Houslanger & Assocs., 2018 WL 3941943 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018) (Mag.) (refusing to dismiss FDCPA claim against collector that froze debtor’s bank account by filing garnishment on Utica bank; here, debtor lived and banked in New Jersey and creditor failed to give notice of the assignment of the debt to a debt buyer), adopted by 2018 WL 4781143 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018); Kieffer v. New Century Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 1899272 (D.N.J. May 19, 2011) (couple stated FDCPA claim; levy on joint account containing mostly non-debtor’s earnings was unfair tactic to pressure husband to pay wife’s premarital debt; fact issue whether creditor knew account was joint); Bray v. Cadle Co., 2010 WL 4053794 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2010) (FDCPA claim; garnishment of account knowing—or having reason to know—that it contained only exempt funds and refusal to release funds upon showing that they were exempt); Phillips v. Messerli & Kramer, 2008 WL 5050127 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2008) (allowing FDCPA claim to go forward against law firm that levied on third party’s funds that were in joint account with judgment debtor; litigation privilege does not protect the firm); Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 522 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (fact question whether statutory requirement of “reasonable cause to believe” met when large-volume collection firm did crude screening, eliminating debtors aged over age sixty-five with no employer or trade lines listed on credit report; denying summary judgment on FDCPA and UDAP claims); Hogue v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (debtor stated claim under federal and Iowa fair debt collection acts and Iowa Uniform Consumer Credit Code against creditor and its attorney who continued garnishment after being shown affidavit and bank statements showing that account contained only exempt Social Security benefits); Jordan v. Thomas & Thomas, 2007 WL 2838474 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2007) (FDCPA claim stated; frozen account contained only exempt Social Security funds; fact question whether collector’s attorneys conducted investigation or had reasonable cause to believe account contained non-exempt funds). See also Biliar v. Atl. Credit & Fin., Inc., 2011 WL 3418196 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2011) (FDCPA violation if creditor’s employee stated that creditor could seize non-debtor’s funds from joint accounts); Strom v. Nat’l Enter. Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1233118 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (threat to seize or freeze exempt Social Security violates FDCPA); Stewart v. Cheek & Zeehandelar, L.L.P., 252 F.R.D. 387 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (granting class certification on claim that law firm and collector violated FDCPA and state consumer protection law by bringing garnishment actions and freezing bank accounts without investigating whether bank accounts contained non-exempt funds). Cf. Henneberger v. Cohen & Slamowitz, L.L.P., 2010 WL 1405578 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (freezing account containing only exempt benefits did not violate FDCPA because collector had right to use New York procedure to determine whether debtor’s claim of exemption was valid; however, threatening to take exempt funds violated provisions forbidding harassing conduct or threat to take action that could not legally be taken); Estrada v. Mendoza, 275 P.3d 1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (allowing consumer to proceed with UDAP claim based on creditor’s deception in obtaining writs of garnishment for more than amount owed; collateral estoppel does not bar this claim because consumers are not seeking to have the writs withdrawn or the garnishments released). But see Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Liebsker & Moore, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2007) (law firm’s service of citation on bank, resulting in three-week freeze on account containing only exempt SSI funds, not unfair or unconscionable under FDCPA where procedure complied with state law); Riordan v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 2010 WL 3023292 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2010) (no FDCPA claim against law firm that repeatedly froze account containing only exempt Social Security funds); Lange v. CIR Law Offices, 2010 WL 2524089 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2010) (FDCPA and state debt collection act claims fail; must show knowing garnishment of exempt funds; creditor has no duty to investigate source of funds when California law places that duty on garnishee financial institution); Hollowell v. Hosto, 2010 WL 1416519 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2010) (no FDCPA claim against law firm that froze account containing exempt Social Security funds where debtor did not allege that he asserted exemption; state may place reasonable burden on debtor to claim exemptions), aff’d as modified, 389 Fed. Appx. 583 (8th Cir. 2010) (modifying district court order to dismiss all claims with prejudice); Wetherelt v. Larsen Law Firm, P.L.L.C., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Mont. 2008) (dismissing FDCPA claim; not unfair or unconscionable to freeze account containing only Social Security funds; debtor’s statement to creditor was unsworn and Montana provides no alternative ways to find out if account contains non-exempt funds); Parker v. Wetch & Abbot, P.L.C., 2006 WL 4846042 (S.D. Iowa July 11, 2006) (freeze of account containing exempt benefits did not violate anti-alienation clause of Social Security Act, state or federal fair debt collection acts, or state consumer protection law). See generally National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection §§ 8.2–8.4, 16.4.4.6 (9th ed. 2018), updated at www.nclc.org/library.

  • 600 See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-1005 (providing double damages remedy for seizure of exempt property).

  • 601 See, e.g., Sigg v. Emert, 361 P.3d 523 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (table; text available at 2015 WL 7694132) (reversing summary judgment against debtor; debtor may bring wrongful garnishment action against creditor’s attorney even if he did not present objection to court that issued the garnishment).

  • 602 Christensen v. Ariz. Cent. Credit Union, 2008 WL 4853414 (D. Ariz. Nov. 10, 2008) (anti-alienation provision of the Social Security Act provides a cause of action against creditor’s lawyers but not garnishee bank), later op. at 2008 WL 5054562 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2008) (allowing claim under anti-alienation provision to go forward against debt buyer); Albright v. Allied Int’l Credit Corp., 2003 WL 22350928 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2003) (denying motion to dismiss claim that collector violated anti-alienation provision by threatening to garnish exempt benefits). But see Neal v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 2018 WL 5786119, at *8 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2018) (no private right of action under 38 U.S.C. § 5301, which protects veterans benefits); Jordan v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 91 F. Supp. 3d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Sykes v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 2014 WL 4627907 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (no private right of action pursuant to anti-alienation clause, but section 1983 provides cause of action against government actor that levied on exempt SSI funds for child support); Strine v. Gennessee Valley Credit Union, 2013 WL 636469 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013), adopted by 2013 WL 636714 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013) (no private right of action for violation of anti-alienation provision); Alexander v. Bank of Am., 2007 WL 3046637 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2007) (no private right of action for violation, by creditor, creditor’s attorney, or bank, of the anti-alienation provision; only remedy is release of the garnishment); Zeppieri v. New Haven Provision Co., 163 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Conn. 2001) (anti-alienation provision’s exemption of Social Security funds in bank account is not self-executing, so sheriff not liable under section 1983 for role in executing upon exempt funds). But cf. Walton v. U.S. Bank, 2010 WL 3928507 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2010) (anti-alienation clause of Social Security Act does not confer private right of action against third-party garnishee); Parker v. Wetch & Abbot, P.L.C., 2006 WL 4846042 (S.D. Iowa July 11, 2006) (freeze of account containing exempt benefits did not violate anti-alienation clause of Social Security Act, as state law provided adequate procedural mechanism for debtor to assert exemption).

  • 603 Sykes v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 2014 WL 4627907 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (debtor stated section 1983 claim against government agency that levied on bank account, containing only SSI, for child support; but dismissing claim against bank, which was not state actor); Granger v. Harris, 2007 WL 1213416 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (recipient stated section 1983 claim against bank that disbursed funds to creditor, despite knowledge that funds were Social Security funds; state statute imposing sanctions on bank that failed to comply with restraining order was state compulsion sufficient to allege action under color of state law); Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 2005 WL 2105810, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (refusing to dismiss debtor’s section 1983 claim against banks that froze exempt funds in their bank accounts; bank’s actions are under color of state law because they are compelled by the state); Chatman v. Arrowhead Credit Union, 2016 WL 896683 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016) (unpublished) (if credit union froze or turned over exempt Social Security funds in response to order of state taxing authorities, it is a state actor and will be liable if state procedures violated Due Process clause or the anti-assignment provisions of the SSA; state law shielding entities that comply with tax levies cannot protect against violations of federal law). But see London v. RBS Citizens, 600 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2010) (bank not acting under color of state law when it violated state law by freezing exempt funds in response to garnishment order clearly limited to non-exempt funds); Moore v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 2010 WL 4962909 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2010) (bank that froze and disbursed non-debtor joint owner’s SSDI funds not a state actor); Walton v. U.S. Bank, 2010 WL 3928507 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2010) (bank not acting under color of state law when it responded to garnishment order by freezing account containing Social Security and veterans benefits of debtor’s non-debtor father). See generally § 13.5, supra.

  • 604 Hogue v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Iowa 2007).

  • 605 See, e.g., Gates v. MCT Grp., Inc., 678 Fed. Appx. 539 (9th Cir. 2017) (levy on bank account containing exempt benefits did not violate FDCPA or state debt collection statute; no duty to investigate); Lange v. CIR Law Offices, 2010 WL 2524089 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2010) (collection firm not liable under federal and state debt collection statutes without evidence that it knew funds were exempt; no duty to investigate).

  • 606 Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co. L.P.A., 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006).

  • 607 Id. at 435. See also Rahaman v. Weber, 2005 WL 89413 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2005); Contact Res. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gregory, 806 N.Y.S.2d 407 (N.Y. City Ct. 2005) (protective order requires creditor to include in prejudgment restraining notice statement that notice ineffective as to accounts containing only exempt SSI and SSD benefits). But see Fuqua v. Associated Credit Serv., 2018 WL 2371102 (E.D. Wash. May 24, 2018) (dismissing FDCPA claim; statement in garnishment application that creditor “has reason to believe” that account contains non-exempt funds does not require that reason to be a good one or that the belief be reasonable; credit check showing that debtor had a bank account and a credit card was sufficient); Hargreaves v. Associated Credit Serv., Inc., 2017 WL 4767146 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2017) (finding that defendants satisfied Washington’s statutory requirement that creditor seeking to garnish bank account allege “reason to believe” account contains non-exempt funds; noting that “it is sufficient for Defendants to find that debtor is employed and has a bank account . . . and does not know or have reason to believe” that the account contains only exempt funds; dismissing claims under FDCPA, state debt collection statute, and state deceptive practices statute).

  • 608 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).

  • 609 Christensen v. Ariz. Cent. Credit Union, 2008 WL 4853414 (D. Ariz. Nov. 10, 2008).

  • 610 Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 2005 WL 2105810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005).