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13.3.1 Exemption Laws Must Be Liberally Construed in Favor of the Debtor

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  5. 13.3.1 Exemption Laws Must Be Liberally Construed in Favor of the Debtor

13.3.1 Exemption Laws Must Be Liberally Construed in Favor of the Debtor

State and federal exemption laws, which exclude a wide variety of income and property from seizure by creditors, are a fundamental safeguard for the protection of low-income persons. Exemption laws are designed to protect debtors and their families from destitution and to afford debtors a means of financial rehabilitation.

Exemption laws were established to protect a limited amount of a debtor’s property from forced sale for the payment of debts. Courts have enumerated the following purposes of exemption laws: (1) to provide the debtor with enough money to survive; (2) to protect the debtor’s dignity; (3) to afford a means of financial rehabilitation; (4) to protect the family unit from impoverishment; and (5) to spread the burden of a debtor’s support from society to his creditors.43 Courts have the equitable power to stay executions upon terms and conditions that are just, such as installment payments.44

Exemption laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor and the debtor’s family.45 Courts recognize the strong public policy in favor of the preservation of the home,46 “the necessary shelter and personal property required for [families’] welfare in difficult economic circumstances,”47 and the assurance of “the basic necessities.”48 If it is possible to construe an exemption statute either favorably or unfavorably to the debtor, the favorable method should be chosen.49

Conversely, as garnishment is a harsh remedy, created by statute in derogation of common law, garnishment statutes are strictly construed.50 A creditor’s failure to comply strictly with all procedural requirements of the statute will result in quashing the garnishment.51 Exceptions to exemption laws are narrowly construed.52

Footnotes

  • 43 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir. 1989) (Minn. law); In re Kester, 339 B.R. 749 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006) (Kan. law) (homesteads protected “for the benefit of society and of the family—to protect the family from destitution and society from the danger of her citizens becoming paupers”), aff’d, 493 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Longey, 2008 WL 2074041 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. May 14, 2008) (intention of homestead laws “is to ensure shelter for families, not to protect the rights of creditors”); In re Dwyer, 305 B.R. 582, 585 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (protect families from destitution and relieve state of support burden); N. Side Bank v. Gentile, 385 N.W.2d. 133 (Wis. 1986); W. Vukowich, Debtors Exemption Rights, 62 Geo. L.J. 779 (1974).

  • 44 See, e.g., Quality Carpets v. Carter, 587 A.2d 254 (N.H. 1991) (court has equitable power to stay executions on terms and conditions it considers just, and this power was not undermined by legislature’s enactment of installment payment statute); Keystone Sav. Ass’n v. Kitsock, 633 A.2d 165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (court in which execution proceedings are pending has inherent right to stay proceedings when it is necessary to protect the rights of the parties). See also Gerber v. Holcomb, 2006 WL 3019731 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006) (courts have authority to order wage garnishment in amount lower than statutory maximum). See generally § 14.2.3.3, infra.

  • 45 Wilder v. Inter-Island Stream Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 29 S. Ct. 58, 53 L. Ed. 164 (1908).

    ALABAMA: In re Rutland, 318 B.R. 588 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004); In re Hughes, 306 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004); In re Avery, 514 So. 2d 1380 (Ala. 1987).

    ALASKA: Gutterman v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 597 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1979).

    ARIZONA: In re Thiem, 443 B.R. 832 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011); In re Buchberger, 311 B.R. 794 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004) (liberally construing motor vehicle exemption to include all-terrain vehicle); ML Servicing Co., Inc. v. Coles, 334 P.3d 745, 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).

    ARKANSAS: In re Kelley, 455 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011); In re Evans, 190 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995), aff’d, 108 F.3d 1381 (8th Cir. 1997) (table; text available at 1997 WL 124273).

    CALIFORNIA: In re Kelley, 2012 WL 5878240 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012); In re Morse, 237 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. D & M Cabinets, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2009) (construing homestead exemption liberally; refusing to allow creditor to enforce clause allowing appointment of receiver to sell home as a way of bypassing judicial procedure for foreclosure of judgment lien on homestead).

    COLORADO: In re Elliot, 448 B.R. 843 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011) (Colorado homestead exempts proceeds of voluntary sale or sheriff’s sale but is silent as to non-judicial foreclosure; principle of liberal interpretation requires exemption of surplus from non-judicial foreclosure); Fleet v. Zwick, 994 P.2d 480 (Colo. App. 1999); In re Marriage of Gedgaudas, 978 P.2d 677 (Colo. App. 1999).

    CONNECTICUT: In re Clifford, 222 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).

    DELAWARE: Wilmington Tr. Co. v. Barry, 338 A.2d 575 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), aff’d, 359 A.2d 664 (Del. 1976) (Mem.).

    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Jones, 117 A.2d 226 (D.C. App. 1955).

    FLORIDA: In re Colwell, 196 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Crespo, 2017 WL 2437240 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 5, 2017) (applying principle of liberal construction to hold that failure to claim head of household wage exemption in state proceeding did not waive the exemption; noting that because voluntary waiver is forbidden by Florida law, it is unlikely that legislature authorized unintentional waiver); In re Prestwood, 322 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (liberally construing Florida homestead exemption to apply when debtor maintained extensive ties to California but sufficiently demonstrated intent to live in Florida); In re Yettaw, 316 B.R. 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (recreational vehicle occupied as residence was exempt); In re Dwyer, 305 B.R. 582, 585 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004); In re Lazin, 217 B.R. 332 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (liberally construing Florida exemption for annuity contracts); Osborne v. Dumoulin, 55 So. 3d 577, 582 (Fla. 2011) (applying rule of liberal construction to statutory personal property exemption that depends on not claiming homestead exemption); Goldenberg. v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2001) (Fla. law); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2001) (constitutional homestead exemption is liberally construed); Broward v. Jacksonville Med. Ctr., 690 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1997).

    GEORGIA: In re McFarland, 500 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013), aff’d, 790 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2015).

    HAWAII: Schuler v. Wallace, 607 P.2d 411 (Haw. 1980).

    IDAHO: Novas v. Russ Dean Ford, Inc., 2009 WL 721549 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2009); In re Moore, 269 B.R. 864 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); In re Marples, 266 B.R. 202 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); In re Atkinson, 258 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); In re Gallegos, 226 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998).

    ILLINOIS: In re Simpson, 238 B.R. 776 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1999); In re Brockhouse, 220 B.R. 623 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).

    INDIANA: Levin v. Dare, 203 B.R. 137 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (liberally construing ambiguous statute to hold property exempt); In re Robertson, 227 B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1998) (Indiana courts have a longstanding practice of construing exemption statutes liberally in favor of debtors). Cf. In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2003) (Ind. law) (noting rule of liberal construction but rejecting debtor’s interpretation of exemption statute).

    IOWA: In re Wilson, 305 B.R. 4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004); In re Longstreet, 246 B.R. 611 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2000); LPP Mortg., Ltd. v. Meurer, 2004 WL 57585 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2004). See also Iowa State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Michel, 683 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 2004) (homestead rights are jealously guarded by the law).

    KANSAS: In re Thexton, 39 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); Redmond v. Kester, 159 P.3d 1004 (Kan. 2007); Bohl v. Bohl, 670 P.2d 1344 (Kan. 1983); Celco, Inc. v. Davis Van Lines, 598 P.2d 188 (Kan. 1979).

    KENTUCKY: In re Powell, 173 B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1994).

    LOUISIANA: In re Black, 225 B.R. 610 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998); Grantham v. Johnson, 134 So. 3d 164 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (homestead exemption liberally construed; statute denying homestead for judgments resulting from criminal conviction is penal and strictly construed; allowing homestead for defendant found civilly liable, but not criminally convicted, for attempted murder for which co-defendant was convicted).

    MAINE: In re Maylin, 155 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993).

    MARYLAND: Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, L.L.C., 987 A.2d 48 (Md. 2010).

    MASSACHUSETTS: In re Perry, 357 B.R. 175 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); In re Gray, 378 B.R. 728 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (applying rule of liberal construction to exempt manufactured home on leased land); Dwyer v. Cempellin, 673 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1996).

    MICHIGAN: Blow v. Blow, 350 N.W.2d 890 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).

    MINNESOTA: In re Irish, 403 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Drenttel, 403 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir. 1989). But cf. Lang v. Dorosh, 2010 WL 5292607 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2010) (debtor must strictly comply with procedure for claiming exemptions; denying exemption for retirement account because debtor failed to enclose required account statements).

    MISSISSIPPI: In re Cobbins, 227 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 2000) (liberal construction required, but mobile home not exempt unless debtor also owns land).

    MISSOURI: In re Moore, 251 B.R. 380 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000) (liberally construing motor vehicle exemption to include recreational all-terrain vehicles when statute did not specifically exclude them); In re Galvin, 158 B.R. 806 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).

    MONTANA: In re Snyder, 149 P.3d 26 (Mont. 2006). Accord In re Siegle, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1627 (Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 6, 2000), amended by 257 B.R. 591 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2001); In re Rhines, 227 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998).

    NEBRASKA: In re Bailey, 172 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1959).

    NEVADA: In re Christensen, 149 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2006); Besnilian v. Wilkinson, 25 P.3d 187 (Nev. 2001).

    NEW HAMPSHIRE: Deyeso v. Cavadi, 66 A.3d 1236 (N.H. 2013); Landry v. Landry, 917 A.2d 1262 (N.H. 2007).

    NEW MEXICO: Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 951 P.2d 1066 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).

    NEW YORK: In re Ward, 595 B.R. 127 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Santiago-Monteverde, 22 N.E.3d 1012, 1017 (N.Y. 2014).

    NORTH CAROLINA: In re Cain, 235 B.R. 812 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1998); Household Fin. Corp. v. Ellis, 419 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 429 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 1993) (per curiam).

    NORTH DAKOTA: In re Danduran, 657 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2011) (homestead exemption); In re Hankel, 223 B.R. 728 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1998).

    OHIO: In re Gaydos, 441 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (liberally construing Ohio’s provision of specific exemption for motor vehicle not to bar use of tools-of-trade exemption for truck used to earn living); In re Jones, 318 B.R. 841 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Shaffer, 228 B.R. 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998); Meadow Wind Healthcare Ctr. v. McInnes, 2000 WL 1055938 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2000).

    OKLAHOMA: In re Anderson, 932 P.2d 1110 (Okla. 1996).

    OREGON: In re Casserino, 379 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Stratton, 269 B.R. 716 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001).

    PENNSYLVANIA: Marine Midland Bank v. Surfbelt, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Pa. 1982).

    PUERTO RICO: In re Martinez-Colon, 2014 WL 3616235 (D. P.R. July 21, 2014) (liberally construing exemption for a laborer’s “cart” to include interior decorator’s SUV); In re Rivera, 499 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D. P.R. 2013) (noting rule of liberal construction); In re Soto, 2013 WL 3779382 (Bankr. D. P.R. July 18, 2013) (noting rule of liberal construction and finding sufficient compliance with procedure for claiming homestead).

    SOUTH CAROLINA: In re Childers, 526 B.R. 608 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015) (stating rule of liberal construction, but allowing sale of home in which debtors had no equity); In re Scheffer, 78 B.R. 783 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987) (construing household goods exemption to include table silverware).

    SOUTH DAKOTA: In re Lind, 10 B.R. 611 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); Beck v. Lapsley, 593 S.W.2d 410, 413 (S.D. 1999).

    TENNESSEE: In re Hogue, 286 S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. 2009).

    TEXAS: In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2003) (Tex. law); In re Crockett, 158 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998); In re McDaniel, 70 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Bading, 376 B.R. 143 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) (homesteads are “a favorite of the law”; liberal construction required); Pierce v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App. 2007) (history of homestead laws; principle of liberal construction).

    UTAH: In re Carlson, 303 B.R. 478 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004); P.I.E. Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1988); Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Miller, 31 P.3d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).

    VERMONT: In re Roberge, 307 B.R. 442 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2004); Mercier v. Partlow, 546 A.2d 787 (Vt. 1988).

    VIRGINIA: Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Webb, 214 B.R. 553 (E.D. Va. 1997); In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016) (exemption laws “reflect a public policy in favor of having debtors retain essential property over the satisfaction of creditors’ claims” and are to be liberally construed); In re Hasse, 246 B.R. 247 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000); In re Ward, 210 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). But see In re McWilliams, 296 B.R. 424 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (strictly construing recording requirements of Virginia homestead exemption statute). But cf. In re Stoney, 445 B.R. 543, 546–547 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (substantive provisions are construed liberally but procedural requirements strictly); In re Jackson, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 525 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2001) (homestead exemption statute is liberally construed, but its procedural requirements are construed strictly, so homestead deed untimely).

    WASHINGTON: In re Longey, 2008 WL 2074041 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. May 14, 2008) (applying rule of liberal construction when state law unclear as to retroactive application of increased homestead amount); Macumber v. Shafer, 637 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1981); In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).

    WEST VIRGINIA: ACF Indus., Inc. v. Credithrift of Am., Inc., 312 S.E.2d 746 (W. Va. 1983).

    WISCONSIN: In re Bogue, 240 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999); Schwanz v. Teper, 223 N.W.2d 896 (Wis. 1974).

    WYOMING: In re Vigil, 74 Fed. Appx. 19 (10th Cir. 2003); In re Kwiecinski, 245 B.R. 672 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000); In re Winters, 251 B.R. 441 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (table; text available at 2000 WL 914181); In re Bechtoldt, 210 B.R. 599 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997).

  • 46 See, e.g., In re Perry, 357 B.R. 175 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (noting important public policy of protecting home and allowing exemption when it was impossible to tell whether homestead declaration or bankruptcy petition filed first); In re Kester, 339 B.R. 749 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006) (Kan. law) (homesteads protected “for the benefit of society and of the family—to protect the family from destitution and society from the danger of her citizens becoming paupers”), aff’d, 493 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Kelley, 2012 WL 5878240 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (“the purpose of the homestead law is not . . . to protect creditors, but protects the home against creditors . . . preserving the home for the family . . . this strong public policy requires courts to adopt a liberal construction”); Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 359 B.R. 755 (D.S.D. 2007) (strong public policy in favor of South Dakota homesteads; waivers permitted but must be very clear; invalid here as against public policy); In re McCollum, 363 B.R. 789 (E.D. La. 2007); United States v. Neff, 2007 WL 776532 (D.N.D. Mar. 12, 2007) (history of North Dakota homestead law; noting important public policy served by homestead; ambiguous language in loan documents does not waive homestead exemption); In re Ward, 595 B.R. 127, 137 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting the benefits of preserving the home); In re McDaniel, 2012 WL 174370 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 20, 2012) (homestead exemption protects spouse and family as well as declarant, and they should not be punished for his wrongdoing); In re Ritter, 2009 WL 1024656 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2009) (Texas homestead law “can neutralize the ignorance and improvidence of affected borrowers . . . penalize the complicity of colluding lenders . . . no means of evasion—no means of execution—are free from scrutiny or exempt from reversal”); In re Walsh, 359 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (Massachusetts homestead declaration protects entire family, not just individual who files); In re Hughes, 306 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (rule of liberal construction applies especially to laws protecting homestead); First Ala. Bank v. Renfro, 452 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 1984); Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. D & M Cabinets, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Fleet v. Zwick, 994 P.2d 480 (Colo. App. 1999) (“it has long been the policy of this state to preserve the home for the family, even at the sacrifice of just demands”); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2001); In re Bly, 456 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1990) (homestead exemption “not for the benefit of the husband or wife alone, but for the family of which they are a part”; exemption protected against drug forfeiture); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Danielson, 771 N.W.2d 653 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (table; text at 2009 WL 1492644); Dwyer v. Cempellin, 673 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1996) (“the value of securing to householders a home for the family regardless of the householder’s financial condition”); Deyeso v. Cavadi, 66 A.3d 1236 (N.H. 2013) (New Hampshire homestead statute “expresses the legislature’s intent to place the security of families in their homes before the interests of unsecured creditors”); In re Martin, 875 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1994) (“the beneficent spirit of protecting the family home”); Pierce v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App. 2007) (history of homestead laws). See also Ash-Will Farms, L.C. v. Leachman Cattle Co., 2006 WL 3827453 (D. Mont. Dec. 27, 2006) (refusing on equitable grounds to order marshalling, which would have required government creditor to enforce debt against homestead and leave non-exempt property for other creditors; causing farmers to lose their homestead would be “an injustice”); In re Gardner, 2013 WL 3804594 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 19, 2013) (special position of homesteads); Bakwin v. Mardirosian, 6 N.E.3d 1078 (Mass. 2014) (noting strong public policy of protecting innocent spouses, especially if property is innocent spouse’s home).

  • 47 In re Brockhouse, 220 B.R. 623 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).

  • 48 In re Hazelhurst, 228 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1998).

  • 49 In re Perry, 357 B.R. 175 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (allowing exemption when it was impossible to tell whether homestead declaration or bankruptcy petition filed first because clerks’ time stamps indicated same minute); In re Kimble, 344 B.R. 546 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (liberally construing Ohio exemption of “an interest” to include future interest—here, a remainder interest); In re Brockhouse, 220 B.R. 623 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998); In re Snyder, 149 P.3d 26 (Mont. 2006) (liberally construing homestead to include sale proceeds, even if no homestead declaration filed before sale; noting inconsistency in statutes that exempt proceeds but require a declaration that owner resides on property).

  • 50 In re Shubert, 525 B.R. 536 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (Georgia garnishment statutes are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed; debtor retained property rights in funds turned over to court but not yet distributed to creditor). See also Moory v. Quadras, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 275 (Ark. 1998); Pineiro v. Am. Express Card Serv. Co., 105 So. 3d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). But see ML Manager, L.L.C. v. Jensen, 842 N.W.2d 566 (Neb. 2014) (although garnishment statutes are in derogation of common law, they are to be interpreted, like other parts of code of civil procedure, using ordinary rules of statutory construction; overruling line of cases calling for strict construction).

  • 51 Holloway v. City of Orlando, 2017 WL 4773356 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2017) (Florida requires strict construction; dissolving garnishment because creditor’s response to debtor’s claim of exemption was not a sworn written statement), adopted by 2017 WL 4700422 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2017); Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Hamilton Greens, L.L.C., 2015 WL 5257668 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2015) (applying Florida statute requiring dissolution of garnishment if motion contained any untrue statement; here, judgment creditor asserted that full amount of judgment was owing, when payments had been made); Patino v. El Rey del Chivito Corp., 2013 WL 6670428 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2013) (quashing garnishment because bank’s answer disclosed joint account and creditor failed to show service on co-owner; describing strict notice requirements for bank account garnishment); Crop Prods. Servs., Inc. v. Baxter, 2010 WL 5621323 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2010) (dissolving writ of garnishment for failure to comply with Florida requirement for sworn statement to support creditor’s opposition to defendant’s claim of exemption), adopted by 2011 WL 194618 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011); Dinh v. Motorcars of Distinction, Inc., 2009 WL 3096459 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2009) (creditor who misses short deadline for response to debtor’s head of household wage exemption claim is deemed to have admitted facts in claim; dissolving garnishment and barring new filing); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Contractors & Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 2008 WL 5056526 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2008) (dissolving writs because creditor’s response to claims of exemption was untimely and unsworn); Crews v. Jackson, 218 So. 3d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (creditor’s failure to timely file a contest of debtor’s claim of exemption requires dismissal of garnishment action); Moory v. Quadras, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 275 (Ark. 1998) (garnishment is a purely statutory remedy, and the statute must be strictly construed; writ of garnishment may be issued only by the county court which rendered the judgment); In re Marriage of Hankins, 2008 WL 4615967 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008) (if creditor failed to comply with statutory procedure for contesting hardship exemption, garnished funds must be returned to debtor; remanding to determine whether creditor had good cause for missed deadline); Pineiro v. Am. Express Card Serv. Co., 105 So. 3d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (garnishment statute strictly construed; postjudgment garnishment cannot be for amounts such as postjudgment attorney fees that have not been incorporated into a final judgment); Caproc Third Ave., L.L.C. v. Donisi Ins. Inc., 67 So. 3d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (dissolution of writ of garnishment required; attorney’s hearsay affidavit insufficient because statute requires affidavit of person who sued out the writ); Blach v. Diaz-Verson, 810 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 2018) (use of incorrect form would make garnishment void, but correct form used here); Daluisio v. Daluisio, 894 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (income withholding order, arising from California judgment, failed to comply with California law); Dyer v. Schwann’s Home Serv., Inc., 92 N.E.3d 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (courts can grant garnishment only in accord with the terms and on the grounds specified by the statute; garnishment here was void because there was only a jury verdict, not a judgment as required by statute); Requena v. Salomon, Smith, Barney, Inc., 2002 WL 356696 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 2002) (writ of garnishment properly dissolved when service on debtor not made “as soon as practicable” after service on garnishee; statutory requirements must be strictly complied with); Watkins v. Peterson Enters., 973 P.2d 1037 (Wash. 1999) (garnishment is a harsh remedy and creditor must strictly follow statutory procedure); Bartel v. Zucktriegal, 47 P.3d 581 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); Layne v. W. Va. Child Support Enf’t Div., 518 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1998) (garnishment of disability benefits to collect child support arrearage allowed only if exact statutory procedure is followed). But cf. Regions Bank v. Hyman, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1234 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (late service of notice, and failure to include updated amounts for an exemption the judgment debtor did not claim, were technical and curable, so did not require dissolution of writ); De la Cerda Cabrera v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2013 WL 4634843 (Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2013) (garnishment judgment not void if debtor had actual notice of proceeding; technical defects in service do not void judgment if they do not deprive a party of meaningful opportunity to appear and answer).

  • 52 In re Fakhari, 545 B.R. 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2016) (exceptions to homestead narrowly construed); In re Skinner, 2001 WL 1699660 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2001); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 2001); Carrel v. Carrel, 791 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (exceptions to maximum garnishment restrictions must be narrowly construed).